What’s next for US-China trade negotiations?
「I think we can have a relationship where we still get along pretty well with China and really depend on each other a great deal economically, but it’s going to be a more contentious relationship.」
Made in China 2025—— will it work?
「It’s very expansionary in nature. It’s an intent to create a, I think, British imperialist sort of system where the rest of the world is a resource colony for the Chinese manufacturing base.」
Kim Jong Un met Xi Jinping again—— why?
「But I think the Chinese economic pressure is the main reason why he’s shown more interest in diplomacy.」
Welcome to《 Zooming In》. I’m Simone Gao. The first round of trade negotiations between the U.S. and China weren’t overly successful. Many of the U.S. demands hit straight at the core of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s strategy for Made in China 2025. Can two countries with fundamentally different ideologies come to a trade compromise? How do China’s subsidies compare with those in the rest of the world? And how will recent events with Iran and North Korea affect the second round of trade negotiations between the U.S. and China? We’ll discuss these questions and more in this episode of 《Zooming In》.
Trade representatives from the U.S. and China met for the first round of trade talks. Afterwards, the American negotiating team went straight to the airport without releasing a statement, signaling it wasn’t a success.
根據《紐約時報》 5 月4 日的一篇文章，美國人提出了幾項要求：
According to a May 4th article in the New York Times, the U.S. made several demands, including:
Cutting China’s trade surplus by $200 billion dollars by the end of 2020
＊停止“中國制造2025計劃”中對所有先進制造業的補貼。 Halting all advanced manufacturing subsidies in its “Made in China 2025” program
Strengthening protection against intellectual property theft
Cutting its tariffs to 3.5% on all non-critical sectors, the same rate as the U.S.
And opening its agricultural sectors and services to full U.S. competition
The U.S. seeks fair trade and competition with China, especially in the technology sector.But China is unlikely to make concessions in this area because it is Chinese President Xi Jinping’s core strategy for advancing China’s competitive advantage.
蕭茗（Host/Simone Gao）：貿易戰談判的焦點是「中國製造2025」計劃。習近平希望籍此將中國大陸提升為高科技行業的領頭羊，而不僅僅是世界工廠。回顧歷史，美國不也是在英國退出世界舞臺的中心之後，才成為世界霸主的嗎？為何中共的產業提升計劃讓人恐懼？請聽聽我與南加州大學商學院助理教授Greg Autry博士的討論。他還是《致命中國》的作者之一。
At the core of the trade war negotiation is Made in China 2025. It’s a program that Xi Jinping put in place to structurally convert China from being the world factory to the world leader in high tech industries. Didn’t the U.S. gain its world dominance after the UK yielded its position as the center of the world stage? What is the fear this time around? Let’s hear my discussion with Assistant Professor of Clinical Entrepreneurship from University of Southern California and co-author of Death by China, Dr. Greg Autry.
「Some say, Made in China 2025 doesn’t only seem to be a plan to grow the Chinese economy or making structural changes. It is expansionary in nature. Do you agree?」
Greg Autry（南加州大學商學院助理教授）：「絕對同意，它在本質上是非常擴張型的。它的意圖是製造一個大英帝國式的系統，讓全世界都成為中國大陸製造基地的資源殖民地， 讓中國人的財富和中共的地緣政治力量都增強。其它國家只生產大豆之類的工業原料，銷往中國大陸，但是不許生產制成品或是高科技材料，那些是中共政府要獨佔的領域。我認為這應該讓所有人警覺。」
「Oh, absolutely. It’s very expansionary in nature. It’s an intent to create a, I think, British imperialist sort of system where the rest of the world is a resource colony for the Chinese manufacturing base and that the wealth of the Chinese people and the geopolitical power of the Chinese government accelerates. Other countries will produce things like soy beans and send them to China, but not be allowed to produce things like manufactured goods or high-tech materials which will be the sole province of the Chinese government. And that, I think, should worry us all. 」
「Since joining the WTO in 2001, what has China’s trade strategy been?」
「I think their fundamental strategy has been to target one strategic industry after another. And they’ve been very clear. Often these are explicitly called out in their five-year plans. And they go after that industry by subsidizing the manufacturing, very often with state-owned enterprises funded by state-owned banks. Then they lure in a great deal of Western capital to help them execute on that plan with promises of high returns. And they use that to produce massive overcapacity in that particular field, whether that’s steel or solar modules. This drives the price of the global commodity down to the point that American, European, Japanese companies can no longer afford to reinvest in their manufacturing facilities and keep themselves current and they lose their competitive advantage. This has worked brilliantly for the Chinese. So they end up capturing a monopoly stand in that category, and then they can begin to raise prices in order to bring the profits back to China while their competitors are out of the market.」
「Why is this unfair?」
Greg Autry（南加州大學商學院助理教授）：「我不知道公平與否是不是重要，失去這些產業當然不符合西方國家的利益。中共擁有如此多的經濟力量也不符合人類的利益，因為那些錢支撐他們的政治和軍事力量， 這都是中共的鄰居立即面臨的問題，長遠看也是世界的問題。所以我關心這種行為的長期後果多於關心公平。 還有中國公司，尤其是國有企業，關注在降低成本提高產量上，不關心低層研發和發展，這將損害給人們帶來長期福利的發明者，例如加州矽谷之類的地方。」
「I don’t know if it makes a difference whether it’s unfair or not. It’s certainly not in the interest of the Western countries to lose these industries. I believe it’s not in the interest of the global human race for the Chinese Communist Party to hold that much economic power because that supports their political and military power, which is certainly a problem for China’s neighbors immediately and, I believe, for the rest of the world going forward. So I don’t really worry about issues of fairness as much as I worry about what are the actual long-term outcomes of this. Plus, again, China’s companies, particularly state-owned enterprises, focus on driving the manufacturing costs down and the volumes up, and they don’t focus on fundamental innovation and development. And this is the sort of thing that will undermine the long-term benefits to everybody on Earth that come from the amazing innovation that happens in places like California, Silicon Valley.」
蕭茗（Host/Simone Gao）：「自由市場，自由貿易和公平競爭是人類自由和尊嚴的體現。但是中共政權有不同的價值觀。如果這是美中貿易衝突和其它衝突的根本原因，那麼政策的修改或是政策層面的改善， 真的會解決這些問題嗎？」
「This idea of free market, free trade, and fair competition is a manifestation of human freedom and dignity; however, the Chinese communist regime does not hold the same values. So if these are the driving forces behind the U.S.-China trade conflict and many other conflicts, can policy amendments or changes on the policy level really solve all these problems?」
Greg Autry（南加州大學商學院助理教授）：「我不知道這些辦法能不能解決問題，但是我們別無他法，只能做政策改變，試著強勢保護我們在技術和工業領域的投資。我們要確保技術不會隨便就出口。更遭的是，隨著美國在外的投資而被利用，變成意識形態與自己相反的國家的競爭工具，很諷刺的共產黨已經學會了資本主義的工具，共產黨宣言的一開始，馬克思就明白企業家們創造財富和資本的力量，從而推動國家的發展。我認為中共很明白，在他們計劃的第一步利用資本作為工具的重要性。但是長遠來看，我不認為他們會一直採用這些想法， 他們只是利用這些手段建立力量基礎，好在這基礎之上實現他們別的目標，我認為這很恐怖。」
「I don’t know whether they can solve those problems, but we have no choice but to take policy changes and try to aggressively protect the investments that we’ve made in technologies and industries that produce jobs and wealth for Americans and ensure that those technologies are not simply transported and, even worse, capitalized with American capital investment to become competing institutions in a country whose ideology is opposed to the things that made all that possible. It’s ironic that the communist party has learned to use this tool of bourgeois capitalism. If you read the Communist Manifesto, Marx is very clear at the beginning about the power of the entrepreneurial class to create wealth and capital for a nation to go forward. And I think that the Chinese are very clear about the importance of leveraging that as a tool in the first step of their agenda. But in the long run, I don’t think they’re committed to these ideals. And they simply are using them to get to the power base that they need to execute on what they want to do after that, which, in my mind, is pretty horrific.」
Coming up: Made in China 2025—— will it work?
According to the Center for Strategic & International Studies, 「Made in China 2025」 is a program to 「comprehensively upgrade Chinese industry」. Its goal is to raise China’s domestic production of core components to 40% by 2020 and 70% by 2025.
The Chinese regime relies on financial subsidies to keep costs down and compete in domestic and international markets. According to China commentator Wen Zhao, the regime uses public financial resources and taxpayers’ money to subsidize individual companies and industries. So it’s not the product that’s competitive, but the institution behind it.
One example of this is BOE Technology Group Co., which produces liquid crystal panels in China. The company received government subsidies for scientific research and products. In 2017 it borrowed an export tax rebate and increased its profit by 6 billion yuan.
This gave BOE an advantage in domestic and international markets, and impacted the industry in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
NARRATION: While the Chinese government encourages its own companies to compete internationally, it restricts foreign companies from setting up factories in China to compete in the Chinese market. A typical example is the car industry.
Some say the rise of South Korean science and technology is also a nationwide system, but the difference is that South Korea and other countries have policies for certain industries, not over all sectors.
This nationwide system is unique to China because it can intervene in society in ways that other countries can’t.
Other countries have private banks and independent regulatory authorities that won’t take unnecessary risks. But China can tell its state-controlled banks to provide loans that private banks wouldn’t.
The Chinese government also directly invests in scientific research. Although other countries do this as well, China’s scale is much larger.
蕭茗（Host/Simone Gao）：西方一直在與「大到不能倒閉」的現象鬥爭。當一些企業，尤其是金融企業太大，彼此間聯繫太多的時候，他們的失敗對整個經濟體系造成災難性的影響，這時候政府必須介入去幫助他們，每個國家的政府或多或少都會做這樣的事情，區別是西方把政府救助作為一個保險，而中共政權把政府幫助當作他們的競爭優勢。這個衝突以後會如何演變，讓我們聽聽我和布魯金斯研究所高級研究員Michael O’Hanlon的討論。
The West has long struggled with the「too big to fail」phenomenon. When certain corporations, particularly financial institutions, are so large and so interconnected that their failure would be disastrous to the greater economic system, they must be supported by government when they face potential failure. Every country does this to a certain extend, the difference is, the west uses the government as a safe net, but the Chinese Communist regime uses the government as a competitive advantage. How will this conflict unfold moving forward, let’s hear my discussion with Brookings Institute senior fellow, Michael O’Hanlon.
「Among the US demands in the trade negotiation last week, there is 『Halting all advanced manufacturing subsidies in its Made in China 2025 program』. China turned down that request because for Xi Jinping, this is at core of his strategy for China to gain competitive advantage over other developed countries in the next couple of decades. How do you foresee this conflict unfolding going forward?」
Michael O’Hanlon（布魯金斯研究所高級研究員）：「從傳統意義上講，絕大多數自由市場經濟體不認同直接補貼，因為他們不謀求不公平的競爭優勢。但是對於成熟行業，比如航空業，情況就有所不同。技術已經有了，問題只是生產中優化成本。在這類問題上，我多少能理解中國大陸的立場，因為他們想在重要的技術領域發展。確實，這些關鍵技術不僅事關中國大陸的對外競爭力，而且對增進國民福祉也很重要。所以，我認為一些國家試圖加速技術創新不是壞事。美國也有一些科研項目在基礎研究的核心層面，是由政府部分資助的。甚至政府在一些項目中，資助更先進的技術演示和原型開發。因此，我認為完全可以討論，中國大陸應該在哪些技術領域投資以及投資多少， 如果大陸公司在某些產品的市場開發中，得到中共政府在研發和銷售上的補貼，從而使他們獲得競爭優勢，這就非常接近於違反世貿組織規則了。但是基礎創新、基礎技術、研究，那就是另外一回事了，美國應該認識到這點。我不是說這個事沒有討論的餘地。我認為促進科技創新是合法的，而試圖幫助具體產品低價傾銷就不合法了，這兩者有本質區別。」
「Well, of course, in the classic sense, most free market economies don’t believe in direct subsidization of industry because they don’t want to give unfair trade advantage. But I think that’s a better argument when you’re talking about established sectors like aerospace. And we already have the technology, it’s just a question of producing it at an optimal cost. On this kind of an issue, I have some sympathy for the Chinese position because they’re trying to push forward on important areas of technology, and, yes, those are important for China’s competitive position vis-à-vis other countries, but they’re also important for the wellbeing of humanity. And I don’t think it’s a bad thing for countries to be trying to spur along a certain amount of technological innovation. We certainly have various kinds of scientific research efforts in the United States that are partially supported by the federal government at a core level of basic research, or even in some cases, more advanced technology demonstration and prototyping. Therefore, I think it’s a legitimate question about how much China and where China should invest in areas like artificial intelligence. If it starts trying to give competitive advantage to its own firms as they try to market certain products and then subsidizes the development and sale of those products, that becomes closer to a trade violation according to the normal rules of the WTO. But for basic innovation, basic technology, research, I think that that’s a whole different category of discussion. And the United States needs to recognize that. I’m not suggesting this is a slam dunk case that should not be discussed at all. But there is a major distinction between trying to promote technology innovation on the one hand, which I think is generally legitimate, and then trying to help specific products be sold at perhaps a lower than their proper production cost, which is not legitimate.」
蕭茗（Host/Simone Gao）： 我認為更準確的描述是中國政府承包了一切。中國政府補貼技術創新，同時也幫助中國產品以較低的價格出售，最重要的是他們直接參與利益政府資助的行動來竊取外國技術，我與O’Hanlon先生討論了美國對中國態度的變化，讓我們來聽一聽。
I think a more accurate description is the Chinese government actually does it all. Yes, they subsidy the technology innovation, but they also help Chinese products to be sold at a lower price. On top of that, they are directly involved in using government funded operations to steal foreign technology. The following discussion I had with Mr. O’hanlen addresses the change in the U.S. attitude towards China. Let’s take a listen.
「Over the past decades, the Chinese economy thrived on relying on Western investment and technology sharing. In exchange, the West was eyeing the enormous Chinese consumer market. At what point was this understanding disrupted? What were the driving factors?」
Michael O’Hanlon（布魯金斯研究所高級研究員）：「好問題。我認為有很多原因。不只是因為川普總統的因素，更重要的是美國舉國上下，如何看待中國作為一個經濟夥伴。確實在鄧小平上臺後很多年裡，美國和其它西方國家想和中國大陸在經濟上往來，暫時容忍了中共盜竊知識產權，以及通過各種方式破壞國際貿易規則 。 一部分希望是更繁榮的中國最終會在經濟和安全上成為外部世界的夥伴，更富裕的中國也會部分自由化。然後就像你所說，美國和很多西方國家的公司想要進入中國市場，所以這個原因也讓我們合作。我們設想中國會建設一個更好的法律系統，更有利的投資環境，隨著時間推移，這會繼續改進。現在過去大概十年中，我們確實看見了一些重要改變，開始侵蝕這個框架，這個模型。首先，當然就是中國現在是潛在的軍事威脅，我們在南中國海和中國東海看見明確的軍事行動，還有每年2000億美元的軍費，這意味這中國在用財富對我們不利。第二，習近平已經把他自己的控制和共產黨的強勢合併，至少在中央政策的制定上是這樣。所以這個更富裕的中國會更自由的想法已經證明是錯的了。最後，還有這個越來越惡化的中共對美不公平貿易的問題。西方世界需要加強保護知識產權和市場準入。所以這麼說來，我們不應該把川普看成美國政治的局外人。是的，我認為民主、共和兩黨會在一些領域聯合起來對抗中共。我認為我們還是能和中國大陸維持良好的關係，在經濟上也會高度互相依賴。但是未來雙方關係中會出現更多摩擦，美國也會尋求保護自己的特定利益，力度將超過毛時代之後的任何時期。」
「That’s an excellent question. I think there are a lot of reasons why, not just because of President Trump, but more generally in the United States, the tide has shifted in how we think about China as an economic partner. It’s true that for many years after – especially after the assent of Deng Xiaoping – the United States and other Western countries tried to engage with China economically and tolerated even some intellectual property theft and other kinds of bending of the rules or breaking of the rules of international trade. And part of the hope here was that a more prosperous China would gradually become more of a partner with the outside world in economics and also in security and that China would liberalize partly as it became richer. And that was part of the gamble. And then as you say, also, the United States and many Western countries, their companies wanted to get into that Chinese consumer market, and so we wanted to cooperate for that reason as well. We assumed that China would build a better system of law and a more favorable investment climate and environment. And over time, this would continue to improve. Well, now there are – over the last 10 years or so, we’ve really seen a number of important developments that have begun to erode this framework, this paradigm. For one thing, of course, China’s now a potential military threat, and we see assertive behavior in places like the South China Sea and the East China Sea, along with a $200 billion a year military budget, which means that some of this wealth China is using for reasons that could be at our disadvantage. Second, Xi Jinping has consolidated his own control and the strength of the Communist Party, at least in terms of central policy making. So the idea that wealth or a wealthier China would become a freer China or a more democratic China has been proven to be wrong. And then finally, the last thing I would say is that, of course, now we also have unfair trade practices in China that are really not getting better as time goes by. And the Western world is going to have to protect its own intellectual property and its own market access a little more. So in this regard, we should not view Donald Trump as a particular outlier in terms of American politics. And, yes, I think that Democrats and Republicans will increasingly be united in trying to push back against China in certain areas. I think we can have a relationship where we still get along pretty well with China and really depend on each other a great deal economically, but it’s going to be a more contentious relationship. And the United States is going to seek out to protect certain prerogatives more than it has for most of the post-Mao era.」
Coming up: How will recent events with North Korea and Iran affect US-China trade negotiations?
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un held talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping and other senior Chinese officials on May 7th and 8th. It was the second trip in the past two months, coming in advance of Kim’s talks with President Trump.
On May 8th, President Trump announced his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal.
And Chinese Vice Premier Liu He will come to Washington for round two of trade talks.
Kim Jong Un surprised the world once again by meeting Xi Jinping on May 8th. That was the second visit in two months and right before the Trump-Kim meeting. Is China trying to leverage North Korea as a negotiation chip for its trade issues? What message is Trump sending by announcing the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear deal? Here’s what our guests had to say.
「What do Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping want to get out of their recent meeting?」
Michael O’Hanlon（布魯金斯研究所高級研究員）：「很顯然，北韓想緩解經濟制裁，起因是2017年進行的核試驗和導彈試射。同時中共現在有意在經濟上對北韓施加前所未有的壓力。 這是金正恩不得不通過外交途徑來求和的最簡單的原因。還有另外一些原因，就是他現在有了更精密的核武能力，也許是覺得自己有了談判籌碼了，他也可能是害怕川普總統的威脅。但我認為中共在經濟上施壓是北韓轉向外交途徑的主因，我認為金正恩正在向某些國家示好，他過去忽視它們，不理睬它們，甚至向它們挑釁。金正恩希望中共能減輕對北韓的經濟壓力，但不願向美方作出全盤讓步，特別是要北韓立即完全無核化的要求。他現在是想為即將到來的川-金會預設前提，因為他清楚川普總統是要求北韓立即無核化。我認為金正恩的想法是一廂情願，他最想通過改善與中共和南韓的關係，在實現完全無核化之前，就解除某些經濟制裁措施。我認為這是當前的主題，也是金正恩展開外交攻勢的主要目的。中共要的是一個局勢穩定的朝鮮半島，他們想通過外交途徑來達到這一目的。我當然希望中共能勸金正恩嚴肅對待美方要求，即使美方同意北韓可以分階段棄核，整個過程也不能有絲毫含糊。北韓一開始就得有實質性舉措，比如拆除近年來一直在製造核武的基礎設施。這些課題可能就是促成最近的金-習會的原因。」
「Obviously, North Korea needs to lighten the economic pressure that it’s faced ever since its nuclear and missile tests of 2017. And the Chinese willingness to really put more pressure on North Korea economically than had ever been the case before. I think this is the simplest explanation for Kim Jong Un’s charm offensive. There are other explanations that contribute, perhaps, as well, such as the fact that now he has a more elaborate nuclear weapons capability and maybe he feels more confident in that capability. And he’s also perhaps afraid
a little bit of President Trump’s threats. But I think the Chinese economic pressure is the main reason why he’s shown more interest in diplomacy. So now I think he’s trying to establish good rapport with various countries that he had been neglecting or ignoring or been bellicose towards. And with China in particular, he obviously hopes that even without necessarily making all the concessions that Washington will demand, even without complete denuclearization in the immediate future, that there will still be a lessening of Chinese economic pressure. I think he’s trying to set the table for that kind of a deal with Washington because he understands that President Trump really wants complete denuclearization to happen very fast. I don’t think that’s realistic. And the most important thing for President Kim to do in his own calculous is to improve relations with South Korea and China to the point where he will get some economic relief even prior to any complete denuclearization. And so I think that’s probably much of the subject matter and also much of the overall purpose of these meetings. For the Chinese, you know, they want a stable situation on the Korean peninsula. They would like to see these talks be successful. I certainly hope they’re telling President Kim that Washington does mean business. And even if there could be a phased approach to denuclearization, it’s going to have to be a serious process. And it’s going to have to begin with some significant North Korean steps like dismantling the nuclear weapons production infrastructure that has led to a growing arsenal in recent years. So those are some of the messages and purposes that I expect led to the Kim-Xi summits in recent weeks.」
「 How will President Trump’s exit from the Iran deal affect his upcoming talks with Kim Jong-un?」
「Well, I would expect that North Korea would have two main observations about the Iran nuclear deal. One of them is that it’s for a problem a long ways away, a country a long ways away, a much different situation, especially because Iran has been aggressive throughout the broader Middle East and that’s something that threatens American interests and American allies in a way that North Korea, for all of its main big problems, does not threaten the United States the same way regionally. It is not actively stoking terrorism or violence in other countries the way that Iran is. So the first observation that I believe Kim would have is that Iran is a long ways away and a different problem. But the second observation would be that perhaps he could use Iran as a bit of bargaining leverage. And he can say to President Trump, do you really think I can give up my nuclear arsenal entirely and immediately in a situation where I have reason to doubt that a future American president would respect the deal that you’re now willing to make with me. And maybe even if you promise never to threaten military force against North Korea, maybe a future president would change his or her mind the same way that you, President Trump, changed the American position on the joint comprehensive plan of action with Iran. And, in other words, Kim would use that as a talking point and as a bargaining point of leverage in trying to point out to President Trump why complete and immediate denuclearization is really not realistic for North Korea. I hope that North Korea will completely denuclearize very fast. But I do not expect it. And I think Kim will be looking for ways to reduce the likelihood that he’ll be put under a lot of pressure to achieve that complete and immediate denuclearization.」
「 Will it affect US-China trade negotiations?」
「Well, you know, when I was in Beijing this week, we had numerous track two discussions with some very prominent Chinese scholars at various think tanks, and a number of them said to us, the American delegation from Brookings and other think tanks, they said that we don’t really think these issues need to be linked, but all of us also acknowledged – or many of us acknowledged – that sometimes these issues are linked because the way in which leaders get along, the basic atmospherics of their relationship can affect their ability to address a problem like North Korea. So even if we say that North Korea should be viewed on its own terms, it definitely tends to have some impact just what happens in other sectors like on issues of Taiwan, issues of trade, and so forth. So there’s a partial separation of the topics, but there will not be complete delinkage. I don’t think that’s realistic. 」
蕭茗（Host/Simone Gao）：「Greg Autry是這樣看的。」
「 Here’s what Greg Autry has to say about this topic。」
「 Kim Jong-Un visited China for the second time last week. What do Kim and Xi want respectively?」
「You know, I wish I could be a fly in that room and see what that conversation is about. In my personal opinion, the Chinese government has always used the North Korean government as a tool to off-put the United States geopolitically and militarily. Very often when the Chinese Communist Party needed a distraction from a tense US-China issue, they would, I believe, provoke one of the Kims to move forward and create a situation that required the United States to then go supplicate to Beijing and ask for assistance in managing the Kim regime. The latest king Kim of Korea is now stepping forward, apparently, with this bold move to make peace, both with the South and potentially with the U.S. It’s an interesting distraction, but again, these are not nations that believe in the rule of law, so I’m not sure what you get out of any agreement with them, as we’ve seen with North Korea before. No agreement that you make with that state is likely to be honored. So I will sit back and watch with great interest. As far as what Xi and Kim said, I suspect that Xi told Kim what to do. But who knows.」
「How will president Trump’s exit from the Iran deal affect his upcoming talks with Kim Jong-un? 」
「I think it underscores the fact that we’re suddenly dealing with a U.S. president who isn’t a lap dog to global perceptions of how geopolitics should be managed, but actually stands up for U.S. interests in a bold and straightforward way. The willingness to exit out of a badly conceived previous agreement I think makes it clear to Kim that he’s dealing with somebody who will act forcibly in US interests.」
Host7 (conclusion): We’ve seen a lot of firsts with how the Trump administration handles geopolitics. The withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement and the upcoming talks with Kim Jong Un are a big contrast from previous administrations. And with the next round of trade talks between the U.S. and China, it remains to be seen whether or not a compromise can be made and if two opposing ideologies can come to an agreement. Thanks for watching 《Zooming In》 and see you next week.
Producer: Simone Gao
Writer: Michelle Wan Jess Beatty Simone Gao
Editors: Julian Kuo Bonnie Yu Frank Lin Bin Tang
Narration: Rich Crankshaw
Camera: Jimmy song
Transcription: Greg Yang Xiaofeng Zhang Guiru Zhang Frank Yuan
Special Effects：Harrison Sun
Assistant producer: Bin Tang Merry Jiang
Host accessories are sponsored by Yun Boutique
NTDTV 《Zooming In》
美東： 週二: 21:30
美西： 週二: 21:30
舊金山： 週二： 22:00