【新唐人北京時間2018年03月28日訊】【世事關心】(463)習近平 共產黨川普的三方博弈:習近平以全票連任國家主席,王岐山也在同一天當選國家副主席,像美國總統川普一樣,習近平也終於成立了他理想的執政團隊,但這只是問題的一方面,從表面上看,大陸政界全力支持習近平的連任和修憲,然而在背後,恐懼,怨恨和懷疑依然存在,習近平和共產黨之間會怎樣互動,這種互動對大陸政局和中美關係會產生怎樣的影響?這集我們一起來探討。

中國大陸迫不及待的修憲,來為習近平的終身掌權開道。他本可以按部就班的進行,是什麼原因使他變得如此急切?
China hastily changed its constitution to pave the way for Xi Jinping to rule forever. He could have done this more politely, so why the rush?

文昭(新唐人資深評論員):「那我想他可能是感受到一些現實的壓力,也許他想讓這個官僚體系感受到必須執行他的方案。而靠拖,拖延到他一個任期結束是沒有指望的。」
“In my opinion, he is under intangible pressure that makes him feel he must implement his plan within this CCP bureaucratic system. To delay this issue until the end of his tenure will not help him remain in power.”

共產黨和習近平是真的強大嗎?
Are Xi and the party as strong as they seem?

文昭(新唐人資深評論員):「這次他全票獲得通過,到並不意味這官僚階層的絕對忠誠。只是意味著他的權勢足夠大。大到沒有人敢表達反對。」
“ Unanimous votes cannot be associated with absolute loyalty from the bureaucrats. It only means that Xi has sufficient power. His power is strong enough to ensure zero opposition.”

川普在最後一刻簽署了台灣旅行法。他要向外界傳遞怎樣的訊息?
Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act at the last minute. What signal is he sending?

Ethan Epstein(《標準週刊》副編輯):「第一,他擅長營造戲劇性,所以往往故意等到最後一刻再公佈決定。第二,是釋放信號,顯示美中關係進入了一個新階段。」
“He kind of has a flair for drama. So he likes to do a lot of things at the last minute. The second part of that is, I think, to signal this kind of new phase of our relations with China.”

在麥克•龐皮奧和王岐山主管中美關係的時代,一些熱點問題,比如北韓核問題、南海爭端、兩岸關係和貿易糾紛會出現怎樣的變化?
What will happen to North Korea, South China Sea, Taiwan and the Trade dispute under Mike Pompeo and his counterpart Wang Qishan, Xi Jinping’s closest ally?

Ethan Epstein(《標準週刊》副編輯):「觀察他們兩人的工作和互動會很有意思。但可以肯定的是,這兩強會在很多重要問題上交手。」
“It’ll be interesting to see what the interpersonal dynamics are and how they work. But it’s certainly two assertive guys that are going to be having to deal with each other on a lot of important subjects.”

蕭茗(Host/Simone Gao):大家好,歡迎收看《世事關心》,我是蕭茗。習近平以全票連任國家主席,王岐山也在同一天當選國家副主席。象美國總統川普一樣,習近平終於組成了他理想的執政團隊。但這只是問題的一個方面,從表面上看,大陸政界全力支持習近平的連任和修憲。然而,在鐵幕背後,恐懼、怨恨和懷疑依然存在。習近平和共產黨之間會怎樣互動?這種互動對大陸政局和中美關係會產生怎樣的影響?這集的《世事關心》,我們一起來探討。
Welcome to Zooming In, I am Simone Gao. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s second term win was unanimous, and Xi’s closest ally, Wang Qishan, was elected vice president on the same day. It’s widely suspected that Wang Qishan lost his Politburo Standing Committee Member’s seat last October due to the alleged corruption exposed by billionaire Guo Wengui, the self-imposed exile in New York. Guo is complicated. Many suspect he’s an agent for Xi’s longtime rival Jiang Zemin. However, even if that were true, the relationship didn’t end on a high note as Guo had hoped for. Nevertheless, under pressure, Xi conceded by letting Wang go. Five months later, Wang made it back, indicating Xi has since consolidated his power and was able to reward Wang’s loyalty. As vice president, Wang will most likely be responsible for the U.S.-China relations. Xi finally gets to choose his dream cabinet, much like what President Trump is doing in the U.S. But this is only half the story. Behind the staunch loyalty display of the Chinese bureaucracy over Xi’s election and the constitutional amendments, fear, resentment and doubts linger. What is the true dynamic between Xi and the Party, and how will this impact Chinese politics and U.S.- China relations? Let’s explore these questions in this episode of Zooming In.

2018年3月11日,近3000名中國人大代表齊聚北京人民大會堂,就擬議中的中國憲法修正案表決。
On March 11, 2018, close to 3,000 Chinese Congressional representatives gathered in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing to cast votes on the proposed Chinese constitutional amendments.

1982年版的中國憲法自1988年以來經歷了四次修訂,但這一次卻不同,因為它廢除了共產黨的長期傳統,即規定國家主席任期最多兩次。這實際上把共產黨送回到毛澤東時代。
This 1982 version of the Chinese Constitution has undergone four amendments since 1988. This time, however, is different, as it abolished a longstanding Party tradition to limit any President to a maximum of two terms. This literally sent the party back to the Mao era.

該修正案以2,958票贊同,2票反對和3票棄權輕鬆通過,超過以往四項修正案的得票率。同一週,人民代表大會全票選舉習近平出任國家主席,他的親密盟友王岐山出任副主席。
The amendments passed with flying colors, 2,958 approval, 2 against and 3 abstentions, the highest approval rating among all four previous amendments. In the same week, the people’s congress unanimously voted for Xi Jinping to be president of China, and his close ally Wang Qishan to be vice president.

幾乎沒有人感到驚訝,每個人都明白它意味者什麼 …… 習近平將一直是中國的最高領導人,在未來相當、相當長的一段時間。其實也沒什麼,因為大多數人幾年前就預見到會這樣了。然而,仍有一個問題:為什麼這麼著急呢?
Nobody seemed to be surprised, and everyone understood its implication – China will likely see Xi Jinping as its supreme leader for a long, long, long time. That is fine since most of them have foreseen its coming in the past few years. However, one question remains: why the rush?

今年2月26日,中共中央召開三中全會 。令人奇怪的是,三中全會通常在秋天開,比3月份的人大會議晚大約六個月。今年,它被提前了半年。原因何在?
On February 26, the Communist Party’s Central Committee convened its third plenum session, on which amendments to the Chinese constitution were proposed. What’s odd about this is that usually the 3rd plenum session of the Central Committee convenes in the fall, about 6 months after the National Congress convenes. This year, it was moved up half a year. Why?

蕭茗(Host/Simone Gao):十九屆三中全會提前了半年召開。這和習近平要取消任期限制有關嗎?他的任期還有5年,他為什麼這麼著急今年就要取消任期限制?讓我們聽聽新唐人電視台資深評論員文昭先生的看法。
The third plenum session was moved up 6 months, is this related to Xi’s intention to remove the term limits? He still has 5 years left, why did he have to do it this year? let’s hear from NTD TV senior strategist Wen Zhao.

蕭茗(Host/Simone Gao):「三中全會提前了半年召開。這是為什麼?在您看来,習近平為什麼這麼著急取消任期限制?」
“The third plenum session convened 6 months early, why? Why did Xi rush to get rid of the term limits?”

文昭(新唐人資深評論員):「十九屆三中全會提前召開,是因為二中全會沒有完成它慣例上應該完成的任務。因為按照慣例,二中全會要提出所謂“黨和國家領導人的建議名單”。但是今年這個二中全會只討論了修憲的事情。那就勢必得在兩會召開之前再開一次中央全會,把這個任務給補上。同時習近平他還要提出黨政機構改組的方案拿到兩會上去通過。就是因為要完成的任務太多才造成今年的三中全會不得不提前召開。至於說習近平為什麼要把取消主席任期限制這個事放在今年的修憲上來做呢?因為也沒有規定說在他任期之內,兩年三年之內不能再修憲。那我想他可能是感受到一些現實的壓力,也許他想讓這個官僚體系感受到必須執行他的方案。而靠拖,拖延到他一個任期結束是沒有指望的。反正他會長期執政。也許習近平在接班人這個問題上受到了政治元老的壓力。他通過取消任期制這種方式,讓其他高層勢力通過設立接班人這種方式約束他這種希望徹底破滅。」
“The Third Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee was held early because during the Second Plenary Session, they had not yet completed their assigned tasks. What that means is, by convention, the Second Plenary Session will release the so-called “List of Party leader recommendations." However, this year’s second plenary session only discussed the amendments of the constitution. So they must arrange another central plenary session before the Two Sessions meeting in order to complete this task. At the same time, Xi Jinping proposed and passed his plan for reforming the party and government organizations during the Two Sessions. Too many things are waiting to be completed, therefore, they must move the meeting forward in order to deal with these tasks first. But why was Xi Jinping so eager to cancel the presidential term limit and make these changes on this year’s constitutional amendment? No one ever stipulates that the Constitution cannot be amended within two, three years of his term. In my opinion, he is under intangible pressure that makes him feel he must implement his plan within this CCP bureaucratic system. To delay this issue until the end of his tenure will not help him remain in power. Anyway, I think he will be in position for a long time. Perhaps the pressure that Xi faces comes from those political elders of the CCP. By cancelling the term limit, the hope of high-level forces restraining him with a successor completely collapses.”

蕭茗(Host/Simone Gao):「習近平現在不設接班人意味著他永遠不設接班人嗎?如果這樣中共最高領導人的權利將如何接替呢?」
“ If Xi Jinping does not appoint a successor now, does that mean he will never appoint one? If so, how can the Chinese Communist Party get the next top leader?”

文昭(新唐人資深評論員):」目前習近平比較明確的意圖呢就是說接班人這個問題他現在不想提。他主要是說他不想在他自己沒有辦法完全控制局面的情況下來談接班人的問題。他就是不想再接班人的問題上受制於人。他不想在別人的壓力下設接班人。他也不接受別的高層勢力用接班人這個事情來分他的權。但不是說從長期的角度來看他就排斥,拒絕設立接班人。至於未來他怎麼樣挑選自己的接班人,搞個什麼樣的接班體制,這實際上跟他自己所處的地位是有關的。只要他的權利夠穩固夠強,他有無數的方案可以選擇。比如五年之後,他可以考慮恢復黨中央主席制度,他自己把黨主席,中央軍委主席和國家主席三個職位一肩挑。在黨中央主席下他可以考慮設立一個副主席或是保留現在的總書記,讓接班人來擔任這個職務。然後用一到兩個任期走完這個接班的過程。總之從長遠來看呢,只要他權利夠穩固,他可以有許多種靈活的方式來處理。目前呢他就是不想讓接班人這個因素成為制約他的因素。」
“ By far, Xi Jinping’s clear message is he does not want to talk about a successor now. He does not want to talk about his successor when he cannot have total control over the entire situation. He does not want to be slowed down by the problem of a successor. He does not want to appoint a successor under others’ pressure. He does not accept his power being diverted by other high-level leaders using the excuse of a successor. However, this does not mean from the long run he refuses to have a successor. In terms of how he chooses a successor, what kind of system he will create for the power succession, this is relevant to the position he actually holds. As long as his power is steady enough and strong enough, he has numerous ways to choose from. For example, in five years, he could think of resuming the chairmanship of the Communist Party. He takes the chairman position of the Communist Party, of the Central Military Committee, and the Chinese President. Under the Chairman of the Communist Party, he can appoint a vice chairman, or keep the current General Secretary position of the Communist Party, and let his successor take that position. The succession can take a couple of tenures. Overall, in the long run, as long as he holds his power, he can deal with the succession in numerous flexible ways. Right now he just does not want himself be confined by the problem of a successor. ”

蕭茗(Host/Simone Gao):修正案通過後不久,“移民”這一詞在的網上搜索量增加了十倍。有能力移民的家庭基本上都是中上層。他們怕的是什麼?我們再來聽聽文昭的分析。
Soon after the amendments were approved, the search for immigration online increased ten-fold. Families who can afford to emigrate to another country largely belong to China’s upper middle class. Why are they afraid? Let’s hear from Wen Zhao again.

蕭茗(Host/Simone Gao):「中共修憲之後網上關於移民的搜索增加了十倍。能移民的都是中產階級以上的。你覺得他們對修憲怎麼看?」
“ After the amendment was passed, the keyword search ‘immigration‘ increased ten-fold. Families who can afford to emigrate to another country largely belong to China’s upper middle class. Can you speculate on their opinions to the newly passed constitutional amendment?”

文昭(新唐人資深評論員):」當然我沒辦法代替中國的中產階級思考。但是移民搜索增加這個事可以分析一下。過去20年是中國的中產階級成長壯大的20年。那這20年中走過來的人呢被反复灌輸一種印象,就是中國在不斷走向進步。在政治上經濟上都是這樣,只不過在政治上的步伐慢一些,那是因為中國情況特殊。什麼人口太多國情複雜之類的。但是也會逐漸和世界潮流接軌。是這種印象。那國家領導人的任期制是從鄧小平時代就達成的一種社會共識。似乎在相當的一段時間內,這個任期制它也行之有效,也完成了中共幾輩領導人的權利交接,沒有發生大的動盪。那麼通過修憲取消這個任期制以後呢,給這一代人首先帶來的衝擊就是這個社會會平穩延續的印象被打破了。這幾十年的習慣說改就改了。它並沒有什麼很強的制度性保障突破不了的。以前人們的想法是,政治環境是平穩的,然後自己安心過好日子就行了。別的就不用操心了。現在由於這個修憲的突如其來,就是這種安穩感受到了相當的觸動。」
“ I surely cannot think for China’s middle class. Instead, let’s take a closer look at the increase in immigration searches. China’s middle class has grown rapidly in the past 20 years. Chinese people have been repeatedly told the following propaganda that China has been making constant progress both politically and economically. It’s just that the political reform has been a step slower than the economic progress. This is because China is unique, with its huge population and complicated politics. Having said that, China is on its way to becoming a developed and democratic country. This is the image that the regime would like to engrave in everyone’s mind. The presidential term limit was a consensus reached in the Deng Xiaoping era. It appears that it has been working well for almost 4 decades, allowing smooth transfer of power from one generation of communist leaders to the next without social unrest. The abolishment of the term limit by amending the constitution, however, shattered the image of a stable society that has been progressing smoothly. The constitutional law that had been in place for decades can be annulled overnight. It means that there’s no institutional systems that cannot be broken, no matter how deeply rooted they may appear. People used to think that the political environment was stable, there was nothing to worry about as long as they were left alone to enjoy life. The false sense of security has been shaken by the unexpected constitutional amendment. ”

習近平與共產黨將如何互動呢?下節繼續探討。
Coming up, what is the dynamic between Xi Jinping and the Party? Stay tuned.

中國的國內政治還是一團黑,但是習近平向西方傳遞的信號卻非常清楚:在他的控制下,中國經濟增長,在國際上和西方競爭,但是中國不會轉型為西式民主政體。
Within Chinese territory, politics remain murky. However, in the West, the message Xi sent was loud and clear: Under Xi’s control, China will not morph into a Western-style democracy as its economy grows and competes on an international scale.

當很多人害怕會出現一個獨裁者的時候,財富雜誌的作家Salvatore Babones卻見解獨到:中國從來就沒有一個強健的自由民主政體。它會保持一黨專政。Babones指出了一個被許多人忽視的事實:「習近平不是在強化一人獨裁。他在強化以他為首的共黨專政。」
While many are fearful of a developing dictator, Fortune’s contributing writer Salvatore Babones understands it better: China has never been a vibrant liberal democracy. It will remain a one-party state. Babones also makes a distinction that many failed to recognize. Babone writes: “Xi isn’t so much solidifying One Man Rule as he is solidifying One Party Rule, with himself at the head of the Party.”

中共贏得國共內戰以後,始終牢牢控制中國大陸,共產黨一黨獨大。毛澤東時代大搞對領袖的個人崇拜。入黨對一個人來說意味著一切。在鄧小平時代,黨員身份仍然重要,因為它是獲得名望和權力的途徑。習近平時代,中國變得富有,中產階級不入黨也可以獲得財富和權力。除了那些有志從政的人以外,中共的影響力已經下降。黨員們也不再把黨當回事,幹正事不積極,只管為自己牟利。另一方面,與毛鄧時代那些敢言的黨內異議人士不同,今天的共黨官員幾乎全被習近平的權勢所懾服。而更重要的是,他們早已良知無存。
Since Mao’s Civil War era, China has always been controlled by one party, the Chinese Communist Party, without any close rival. People worshipped Mao during that generation. Party identity meant everything to an individual. By Deng Xiaoping’s era, party association was still important, as membership was the way to earn fame and power. In Xi’s era, Chinese wealth grew, so did middle class’s ability to reach wealth and power outside of the Party’s association. That made the Party itself less relevant except for the people who want to pursue a path within government administrative work. Even party members themselves take the party less seriously as they focus on personal gain instead of actual governance. On the other hand, in contrast to those Party dissidents who stood up against the dictators in the Mao and Deng era, party officials today are mostly tamed, because they are afraid of Xi, but more importantly, they simply don’t care enough to fight.

蕭茗(Host/Simone Gao):習近平與共產黨之間的真實關係是什麼樣的?這對他的執政有什麼影響?讓我們來聽文昭的見解。
What is the true relationship between Xi Jinping and the Party? And what does it mean for his rule? Let’s hear from Wen Zhao again.

蕭茗(Host/Simone Gao):「這次修憲創紀錄高票通過,習近平全票當選國家主席,似乎顯示他在黨內的絕對權威,您覺得習近平和共產黨的真實關係是什麼?中國官僚階層所表現出來的絕對忠誠對管理一個國家來說是好事還是壞事?」
The amendments to the Constitution were passed with record high approval ratings. President Xi got his second term by unanimous votes. It seems that Xi has become the supreme leader of the Party. What do you think the true relationship is between Xi and the Party? Is the absolute loyalty shown by the Chinese bureaucrats good or bad for governing this country?

文昭(新唐人資深評論員):「習近平迄今為止的表現是窮盡一切手段來挽救黨。就包括他在十九大上連任黨的總書記,做的第一件事就是帶領剩下幾個常委去共產黨一大會址,去宣誓,表示永不叛黨。這次他全票獲得通過,到並不意味這官僚階層的絕對忠誠。只是意味著他的權勢足夠大。大到沒有人敢表達反對。如果說全票就代表忠誠,那伊拉克前總統薩達姆就是獲得人們的衷心擁戴了。2002年10月份在伊拉克公投裡面他獲得了百分之百的支持。連任了7年的總統。但是他這回連7個月都沒幹滿,轉過年來2003年美國出兵伊拉克,那些頭一年宣誓效忠, 要用生命保衛他的人,就做鳥獸散了。習近平他在挽救黨的過程中,他的一些做法呢,反過來也讓黨出現了一些脫離既有軌道的跡象。比如他讓政治局常會會這個決策機構被削弱了,現任的幾個政治局常委是他不夠信任的。不是他的嫡系。所以呢他通過一系列的手段削弱了國務院的權利。像這個新的國務院機構改革就起到了這個作用。李克強作為總理的角色被弱化了。但是同時呢習近平的親信副總理劉鶴的地位突出了。同時他又讓王岐山以一個普通黨員的身份重新返聘上崗,躋身決策層,同時他讓他比較信任的中紀委副書記楊曉度當這個國家監察委主任,而不是讓中紀委書記趙樂際來兼任,所以他身邊的一個小圈子已經比較明顯了。這個小圈子掌握了更多決策的權力,就削弱了政治局常委會。所以這種變化呢它給中共這個體制帶來了更多的不確定性。」
“ Xi Jinping’s actions so far seem to be exhausting all means to rescue the Party. He was re-elected as General Secretary at the 19th National Congress meeting. The first thing he did post re-election was revisiting the site of the 1st National Congress meeting with other committee members to take an oath showing loyalty to the Party. Unanimous votes cannot be associated with absolute loyalty from the bureaucrats. It only means that Xi has sufficient power. His power is strong enough to ensure zero opposition. If unanimous votes mean absolute loyalty, then Iraq’s former president Saddam Hussein would have won whole-hearted support of his people. In October 2002, he received unanimous support in the Iraqi referendum. He was re-elected as president for seven years. However, he wasn’t even able to maintain his power for seven months this time. Subsequently, in 2003, the United States sent troops to Iraq; the people who swore allegiance on their lives in the previous year disappeared. In Xi’s rescue mission, some of his actions also sidetracked the Party. For example, he weakened the decision-making body of the Politburo Standing Committee. The current members are not trustworthy. They don’t belong to his loyal clan. Therefore, he weakened the State Council’s rights through a series of measures. The reformed new State Council has played this role. The role of Li Keqiang as a Premier of the State Council was weakened. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping’s trusted vice premier Liu He stood out. He also allowed Wang Qishan to return to decision-making level as a general party member. At the same time, he let his trusted deputy Yang Xiaodu be the director of the National Supervision Committee instead of Zhao Leji, the secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. It is obvious who belongs to Xi’s small circle of trusted members. This small group now holds more power to make decisions. This weakens the Politburo Standing Committee. Therefore, this change brought more uncertainty to the CCP’s system.”

川普簽署了台灣旅行法。這會對美中關係有什麼影響?下節繼續探討。
Coming up, Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act. What will this do to U.S.-China relations? Stay tuned.

蕭茗(Host/Simone Gao):當習近平在中國忙著搞政治運動的時候,川普總統也沒閒著。他在最後一刻簽署了台灣旅行法。幾天之後,他宣布要對價值500 到600 億美元之間的中國進口商品,徵收25%的關稅。他似乎已經忘掉了和習近平之間良好的私人關係,至少現在如此。
While Xi makes waves in the East, President Trump is busy as well. He signed the Taiwan Travel Act at the last minute, and a few days later, he pledged to slap 25% tariffs on $50 to $60 billion of Chinese exports to the U.S. His good relationship with Xi Jinping seems to be forgotten, at least for now.

在美中貿易戰一觸即發的時刻,川普總統簽署了台灣旅行法。這個法案鼓勵美國和台灣的各級政府官員進行官方互動。
Just when the U.S. and China were on the verge of a trade war, President Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act. This act encourages officials at all levels of government to officially meet with their Taiwanese counterparts in Taiwan and vice versa.

這個是重要事件。因為美台無邦交已有快40年了。1979年,在一中政策下,美國斷絕了與台灣的外交關係。
This is significant because the U.S. hasn’t recognized Taiwan diplomatically for almost 40 years. In 1979 the U.S. cut formal ties with Taiwan in favor of the People’s Republic of China under its “one China” policy.

1979年之後,台灣官員不定期造訪美國,美國也派代表到台灣。但是為了不觸怒中國大陸,雙方的會面都很低調,。儘管美國和台灣還沒有正式建交,但是這個台灣旅行法象徵性的支持民主台灣。這讓中共政權非常不愉快。
Since 1979, Taiwanese officials have occasionally visited the US, and US representatives have traveled to Taiwan, but meetings have been low profile to avoid offending China. Although the U.S. still doesn’t have formal ties with the island, this new legislation symbolically supports Democratic Taiwan, and this has made the Chinese regime very unhappy.

那麼誰來處理這個局勢呢?
Now who is going to deal with all these changes……

Rex Tillerson被前CIA局長Mike Pompeo代替。後者對中國態度更鷹派。他視中國為美國的直接競爭對手,擔憂中國可能會威脅到美國的國家安全。與此同時,王岐山在中國被選為國家副主席。他是習近平的長期盟友,領導了習近平的反腐運動。他升任國家副主席之後,外界普遍預期他會主導中美外交事務。
Rex Tillerson was replaced by former CIA Director Mike Pompeo who is more hawkish against China. He views China as a direct rival to America and is deeply concerned over security threats brought by the second largest economy. Meanwhile, Wang Qishan was elected as Xi’s vice president. He has been a longstanding ally to Xi and led Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. With his promotion to vice president, industry experts expect him to be the leading diplomat in dealing with the U.S.

蕭茗(Host/Simone Gao):貿易戰已經開始,台灣旅行法也釋放出強烈信號。川普對中共政府越來越強硬的時候,習近平讓他的最忠實盟友來處理中美關係。這些對美中關係都意味著什麼?來聽一下我對《標準週刊》副編輯Ethan Epston的採訪。
The trade war has started and the Taiwan Travel Act sends a strong signal. Xi Jinping’s most loyal ally will deal with America while President Trump is putting more hawks on his team. What does all this mean for U.S. – China relations? Here is my discussion with Ethan Epstein, Associate editor of the 《Weekly Standard》.

蕭茗(Host/Simone Gao):「川普總統在最後一刻簽署了台灣旅行法。他在釋放什麼信號? 他的目的是什麼?」
“President Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act at the last minute. What signal was he sending, and what does he want to achieve?”

Ethan Epstein( 《標準週刊》副編輯):「有幾點要說。第一,他擅長營造戲劇性, 所以往往故意等到最後一刻再公佈決定。比如,他的司法部長開除了FBI副局長Andrew McCabe,McCabe當時只差兩個小時就達到退休條件了。我認為這多少是川普戲劇化性格的表現,他做的很多事都是在吊人胃口。第二, 是釋放信號,顯示美中關係進入了一個新階段。他當總統的第一年,總統試著和習近平搞好關係。他邀請他去Mar-a-Largo莊園,他們相處愉快,然後他自己去了北京。但是今年以來總統似乎要對北京強硬。顯然,中國不喜歡台灣旅行法,但是目前總統對挑戰中國絲毫不懼。」
“Well, a couple things. He kind of has a flair for drama. So he likes to do a lot of things at the last minute. And, for example, his attorney general fired Andrew McCabe at 10 p.m. on the last day he could fire him before his retirement went in. So I think that’s sort of the dramatic persona of Trump. A lot of the timing of the things he does is sort of to heighten the sense of suspense. The second part of that is, I think, to signal this kind of new phase of our relations with China. During his first year in office, the president tried to strike a kind of harmonious tone with Xi Jinping. You know, he invited him to Mar-a-Lago, they had a nice visit, then he went to Beijing himself. But it seems like this year the president has taken a more hard line on China. Obviously, China does not like this law, but the president seems okay at this point with poking his finger in Beijing’s eye.”

蕭茗(Host/Simone Gao):「台灣旅行法會根本改變美台關係嗎?」
“Will the Taiwan Travel Act fundamentally change U.S. – Taiwan relations?”

Ethan Epstein( 《標準週刊》副編輯):「我看不出來美台關係會根本改變。我是說,美國明顯還在維持一中政策,這個根本點並沒有變,但是這個法案很明顯會被北京視為挑釁。他們明確表示,對台灣的任何幫助都是對他們主權的侵犯。所以我認為這至少會被視為敵對舉動,甚至是不能容忍的。」
“I don’t know if I would suggest that they would fundamentally change. I mean, the US is obviously maintaining the “one China” policy, etc. So there hasn’t been that kind of shift, but this clearly will be viewed as a provocation by Beijing. They’ve made it clear that any accommodations to Taiwan they view as an attack on their sovereignty. So it will definitely, if not poison things, it will be seen as an act of aggression, I think.”

蕭茗(Host/Simone Gao):「川普這樣做的目的是什麼?想增加貿易談判的籌碼?」
“So what does Trump want to achieve from this after all? For example, bargaining power in trade?”

Ethan Epstein( 《標準週刊》副編輯):「我認為川普想迫使中國做兩件事:一是對平壤強硬,二是在對美貿易上做出讓步,比如停止政府出口補貼,對美開放一直被保護的那部分中國市場。那是他的兩個目標。所以我認為他是通過旁敲側擊來施壓。我認為台灣對他來說並不重要。因此我相信他這麼做,是為了斷絕北韓的貿易渠道。」
“ I think the two big things that Trump wants from China is China to take a harder line on Pyongyang and to make concessions on trade by, for example, stopping subsidies of its industries or perhaps opening its own markets to American companies in a way they haven’t thus far. Those are his two goals. So I think he uses other things to kind of push them in a certain direction. And, yes, I don’t think Taiwan is really a particular personal priority for him. So I do think that he probably took this action to push North Korea (sic) on other topics like trade in North Korea.”

蕭茗(Host/Simone Gao):「王岐山剛剛當選國家副主席。他一直是習近平的親密夥伴, 普遍估計王會負責對外關係,尤其是中美關係。那麼Mike Pompeo和王岐山的互動會對美中關係有什麼影響?他們會怎麼處理朝鮮危機、南海爭端、台灣問題和貿易糾紛?」
“You know China just elected Wang Qishan to be the vice president. He has been Xi Jinping’s closest ally who helped him consolidate power through the anti-corruption campaign. It is widely suspected that he will be responsible for foreign relations, especially relations with the US. So what will the Mike Pompeo and Wang Qishan dynamic do to US-China relations? How would the North Korea crisis, South China sea tension, Taiwan and trade disputes be handled in their hands? ”

Ethan Epstein( 《標準週刊》副編輯):「中美之間未來會出現對抗。 Mike Pompeo更硬派,性格更強勢。明顯的,王先生作為習近平的助手,他在中國的外交政策上採取了強勢態度,表現的咄咄逼人。所以我認為會有激烈的衝突。問題是他們需要找到一種共通語言,讓兩個硬漢能交流並且達成協議;否則就會打得不可開交,然後不歡而散。觀察他們兩人的工作和互動會很有意思。但可以肯定的是,這兩強會在很多重要問題上交手。」
“Well, it’s going to be contentious, I think Mike Pompeo was a more hawkish, a more assertive personality. And, obviously, Mr. Wang has – being attached to Xi Jinping, he was taking a very assertive line on Chinese foreign policy too, has been quite aggressive. So I think sparks will fly. The question is will they be able to find a common language where it’s two tough guys that can understand each other and they can hash out agreements, or will they just end up pulling each other’s hair out and walking away. It’ll be interesting to see what the interpersonal dynamics are and how they work. But it’s certainly two assertive guys that are going to be having to deal with each other on a lot of important subjects.”

蕭茗(Host/Simone Gao):相似的問題在聽一下文昭先生的看法。
For similar questions, let’s hear from Wen Zhao as well.

蕭茗(Host/Simone Gao):「彭佩奧如果當上了國務卿,他的對手就會是王岐山。現在馬上需要處理的就是貿易戰。你覺得在他們兩人之下,中美貿易戰會是怎樣的一個狀態?」
“ If Mike Pompeo were to become the next Secretary of State, his Chinese counterpart/opponent would be Mr. Wang Qishan. What needs to be dealt with immediately is a potential trade war. Can you speculate on how the trade war would proceed between US and China under Pompeo and Wang?”

文昭(新唐人資深評論員):「這個貿易糾紛我想首先會是雙方的經貿官員的接觸,就是中國這邊的劉鶴和美國的貿易部長商務談判代表接觸。王岐山他以何種方式出現,何時出現以及扮演何種角色,現在還不是太確定。也許他會在相當程度上介入貿易談判。也許暫時還會保持距離。這個貿易戰總的態勢來講,因為中國是處於大幅度貿易順差的地位,所以他的損失呢會大一些。中方的報復手段也比較少。就是他能打的牌不多。中國從美國進口的商品,排在最前面的兩樣,一個是飛機及其發動機和零部件,第二就是大豆。他很難拿這種大宗商品作為貿易報復的手段。因為中國可以選擇的替代供貨少。你飛機不買波音就得買空客,可是空客它富餘的生產能力也很有限,你的訂單擠進去,那別人的訂單就得延期交付。那你就要支付很高的成本。同時空客它如果忙不過來,它加班也忙不過來,滿足不了別的顧客的時候呢,其他顧客又會轉回到波音那裡去買。所以這類報復手段中國也會受到很大的損失,給美國帶來的淨損失能有多大呢,也未必像想像的那樣。所以他現在不會立刻把這種商品加入貿易報復的名單。像彭佩奧和王岐山這樣的人加入決策,它對雙方貿易的基本格局不會產生什麼影響,因為那是客觀存在的。只是說對雙方的決策會有一定的影響。彭佩奧進入了川普團隊以後他會強化美國政府的強硬立場。」
“To deal with the trade dispute, I believe there will be contacts between the officials in charge of trade and business from both sides, which means China’s Liu He and Wilbur Ross would reach out to each other. It’s still unclear how and when Wang Qishan would get involved, and what role he would play. Perhaps he may step in to a considerable extent. He may also keep his hands off the negotiations temporarily. Here’s my overall assessment of the trade war — because China has been enjoying a significant trade surplus, consequently, it has more to lose. China’s retaliatory measures are also limited due to the lack of strong hands in this game. China’s top imports from the US are aircrafts, jet engines and accessories, followed by soybeans. It’s hard for China to retaliate in the above two categories because there’s few alternative suppliers. If you won’t buy Boeing, then you have to buy Airbus. However, Airbus’s capacity is also very limited. If your orders have to be expedited, then other orders would have to be delayed. Then you have to pay a higher price. In the meantime, if Airbus reaches its full capacity and can no longer produce airplanes fast enough to meet the demands, other buyers would turn to Boeing. Therefore, such retaliation would also hurt China. The net loss inflicted on the US may not be as great as what China had expected. As a result, China would not add these commodities to the list of trade retaliation right away. Pompeo and Wang’s involvement (in trade war or trade negotiations) would not have much impact on the final outcome, because the frameworks and foundation of trade between the two countries would determine it. I suspect that they may have some influence on the decision-making process. Pompeo’s joining the Trump administration would harden the position of the US government. ”

蕭茗(Host/Simone Gao):2018年美中關係開局就充滿火藥味:台灣旅行法;美國對進口的鋼材和鋁材的加關稅;對500到600億美元的中國商品徵收25%的關稅。我們還不知道下面會發生什麼,但是現在貿易戰還沒有全面爆發,中國怎麼應對,值得觀察。目前中國的回應手段比美國出的招數要軟的多。但是,這會持續下去嗎?這些重要話題,《世事關心》將為您持續報導。感謝您收看這期節目,下次再見。
U.S.-China relations were off to a rough start in 2018. The Taiwan Travel Act, tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, and 25% tariffs on $50-60 billion in Chinese exports. We don’t know what’s next. However, in terms of a trade war, it is not full-blown yet. It will be interesting to see how China reacts to it. So far, China’s retaliation has not matched its counterpart. But, will it stay that way in the future? Stay tuned, Zooming In will follow up on all these important topics of our time. Thanks for watching, I am Simone Gao. See you next time.


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策劃:蕭茗
撰稿:蕭茗 Michelle Wan Jessica Beatty
剪輯:郭靖 柏妳 凌帆 唐彬
翻譯:張曉峰 韓笑生 唐彬
校對:李容真
聽打:Jessica Beatty 張曉峰
攝影:Jimmy Song
特效:Harrison Sun
文稿整理:Merry Jiang
合成:唐彬

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《世事關心》2018年3月

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